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Abstract: RFID ownership transfer protocols (OTPs) transfer tag ownership rights. Recently, there has
been considerable interest in such protocols; however, guaranteeing privacy for symmetric-key
settings without trusted third parties (TTPs) is a challenge still unresolved. In this paper, we address
this issue and show that it can be solved by using channels with positive secrecy capacity.
We implement these channels with noisy tags and provide practical values, thus proving that perfect
secrecy is theoretically possible. We then define a communication model that captures spatiotemporal
events and describe a first example of symmetric-key based OTP that: (i) is formally secure in
the proposed communication model and (ii) achieves privacy with a noisy tag wiretap channel
without TTPs.
Keywords: RFID; ownership transfer; trusted third party; RFID; EPCglobal Gen2

1. Introduction
Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a widely-deployed technology for supply-chain and
inventory management, retail operations and more generally automatic identification. Most of these
applications need to be secured.
Ownership transfer protocols (OTPs) allow the secure transfer of tag ownership from a current
owner to a new owner. Three different entities are present in an OTP: the tag T whose rights are
being transferred, the current owner who has the initial control of T and the new owner who will
take control of T when the protocol is completed. OTPs must incorporate security requirements that
protect the privacy of both the new and the previous owner of the tag. For RFID applications privacy
addresses anonymity that protects the identity of tags and untraceability that prevents interrogations
(partial or completed) of a tag being linked. Formal definitions for secure ownership and ownership
transfer are provided by van Deursen et al. [1], while several theoretical models have been proposed
in the literature that address the privacy of RFID systems [2–5].
Several OTPs that address security issues have been proposed. However, preventing a previous
owner from accessing the key(s) of a tag whose ownership was transferred is still an unsolved problem
when symmetric-key techniques are used [6,7]. The current approach for privacy is to either employ
a trusted third party (TTP) to break the trust link between a tag and its owner (e.g., [8,9]), or an isolated
environment (ISE) (e.g., [10,11]) without any adversarial interference. The first approach is centralized
and not appropriate when tags belong to different authorities/companies. In fact, the TTP can be
considered as the real holder of the tag’s rights, while the different owners have simply delegated
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ownership. The second approach assumes a weak threat model and, as claimed in [7]: if such protection
is adequate, then there is no need for security. Our main contributions in this paper are to:
(1)

(2)
(3)

Define a communication model for ownership transfer that addresses spatiotemporal connectivity
(Section 3). Many OTPs do not specify the communication setup and assume channels that are
impractical for RFID settings.
Provide a theoretical analysis of wiretaps with noisy tags (Section 4), show how these could be
implemented and prove that perfect secrecy is achievable.
Present an OTP that is provably secure in this communication model and that uses a wiretap channel
with noisy tags to achieve privacy (Section 5). This is the first example of symmetric-key-based
OTP that does not require TTPs or an ISE. GNYlogic and strand spaces [12–15] are used in the
Appendix A for the security analysis.

2. Background
2.1. Definition and Security Requirements
Tag ownership can be defined as the ability to identify and/or access the tag, which in turn
usually implies knowledge of private keys stored on the tag. Ownership transfer protocols enable
the transfer of ownership rights of a tag T from the current owner Ownc , or seller, to a new owner
Ownn or buyer. At the beginning of the OTP, the seller is the only entity that can identify and trace
T , while when the OTP is completed, T can only be identified and/or traced by the buyer. A TTP is
usually deployed to manage this ownership transfer.
We next list some specific security requirements for OTPs:
Unlinkability or untraceability. An adversary that physically tracks tags can easily determine
which executions are linked. This cannot be prevented. Unlinkability is related to the capability of
linking interrogations after this physical tracking is temporarily interrupted. Different formal models
can be found in the literature (e.g., [2–4]). Intuitively, a protocol guarantees unlinkability or privacy
if no adversary can decide with advantage better than negligible whether two messages taken from
different protocol executions belong to the same tag or not.
Privacy of Ownn (backward secrecy): The current owner Ownc cannot identify T once ownership
rights are transferred to the new owner Ownn .
Privacy of Ownc (forward secrecy): Once ownership rights of T are transferred to the
new owner Ownn , past communications between T and previous owners cannot be traced by
an adversary (or subsequent owners), even if the current private information stored on T is revealed
(e.g., by physical attacks).
OTPs are sometimes designed [10,16,17] to provide extended capabilities such as: tag assurance,
undeniable ownership transfer, current ownership proof, ownership delegation and authorized recovery.
2.2. Related Work
We only review the most relevant symmetric-key-based OTPs for RFID. Saito et al. [18] and
Molnar et al. [16] presented in 2005 the first OTPs for RFID applications. Saito et al. proposed
two protocols: one with and one without TTP. The security of the latter is based on the short range of the
backward channel and assumes that it is hard for adversaries to eavesdrop on this channel. Molnar et al.
proposed a scheme with TTP to manage tag keys by using a tree structure. Some vulnerabilities of
this scheme are discussed in [19]. Soppera and Burbridge [20] modified Molnar et al.’s scheme by
replacing the TTP with distributed local devices called RFID acceptor tags. Osaka et al. [21] used
a kind of TTP with hash values to protect messages and a keyed encryption function for ownership
transfer. Chen et al. [22] and Japinnen and Hamalainen [23] modified Osaka et al.’s scheme to prevent
DoS attacks. Yoon and Yoo [24] also modified Osaka et al.’s scheme, by assuming that owners are
able to change the tag’s key in an ISE. Their scheme had some vulnerabilities described in [25].
Dimitriou [26] proposed RFIDdot, an ownership transfer scheme based on random nonces and a keyed
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encryption function, making the assumption that key updates are performed in a private environment.
More recently, Song and Mitchell [27,28] also assumed an ISE, but used keyed hash functions and
one-time tag identifiers with hash chains. Kapoor and Piramuthu proposed two new schemes [7]
based on a TTP and ISE respectively for the transfer of single tags, while a variant of these protocols
for multiple tags has also been published [29]. Finally, several schemes have recently been proposed
that comply with the EPCGen2 [30] standard for low-cost tags in the UHF band. These again assume
TTPs or ISE and combine simple XOR operations, Cyclic Redundancy Codes (CRC16) and/or use the
on-board PRNG as the security primitive (e.g., [9,31–33]). The security problems of some of these have
been described recently [34].
Motivation: Comparison with Previous Works
As observed, the ownership transfer protocols proposed in the literature rely either on the use
of TTPs or the assumption of an ISE. Typically, TTPs have a centralized management that may not
be compatible with the distributed management of RFID systems. For example, the RFID parties
(the owners) with possibly conflicting interests must trust the TTP that manages their tags. On the
other hand, the assumption of ISEs where no adversary can interfere is an assumption of a weak
adversary model: if such an environment were available, then no other security protection would
be needed [7]. This paper proposes a key exchange protocol that addresses the new owner’s privacy
concerns without resorting to either TTPs or an ISE.
The discussed protocols also use communication models that are sometimes impractical for
real-life scenarios. To illustrate this, let us consider the two protocols proposed in [7]: one with TTP,
the other without TTP (but with an ISE), whose flows are shown in Figure 1. In the first, Figure 1a,
the TTP does not use a reader to communicate with tag T , but communicates directly (Flows 1–2).
This begs the question: if such a TTP were installed in the buyer’s or seller’s location, what trust issues
would arise if the transferred goods belong to different authorities. In the second protocol, Figure 1b,
T interacts first with the current owner (the seller, Flow 2) and then with the new owner (the buyer,
Flows 3–6). However if something goes wrong (Flow 6 is not received correctly), then the process
must be repeated from the beginning. This implies that the buyer and the seller must be available
during the transaction, which restricts the possible transaction scenarios to one location (e.g., to a shop).
In this paper, we define a communication model where tags can only communicate through readers.
This leads to designs of protocols with, if deployed, centralized TTP infrastructures and, in contrast to
the examples described above, that allow the seller and buyer to be in different physical locations.

Figure 1. Example sketches of ownership transfer protocols (OTPs) with trusted third parties (TTPs) (a)
and without TTPs (isolated environment) (b) [7].
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3. A Communication Model for RFID Ownership Transfer
3.1. Entity Capabilities
High-level entities include RFID readers, servers and TTPs. In general, these are able to
perform complex cryptographic operations, such as asymmetric encryption/decryption and digital
signatures/verification.
RFID tags: In this paper, we are only concerned with UHF passive tags that operate in the
far field [35], which are the most common for supply chain applications. These work at higher
distances than tags with inductive coupling, but the delivered power is low; therefore, not too complex
(lightweight) cryptographic tools should be used [36]. Low price is also a common requirement,
and therefore, tamper-resistant shielding and on-board clocks cannot be usually assumed.
3.2. Communication Model
This is defined in terms of its channels with security features, such as privacy and integrity,
and connectivity (availability).
3.2.1. Privacy/Integrity Channels
Between high-level entities (readers, servers or TTPs): These can be considered secure,
since fully-fledged cryptographic techniques can be used.
Between readers and tags: By contrast, these are particularly vulnerable; they are wireless
(the adversary can eavesdrop and block/modify/inject messages), and tags can only implement
lightweight cryptographic mechanisms. Passive tags can only communicate with active entities that
are physically close and provide them with energy: i.e., RFID readers.
3.2.2. Connectivity
Connectivity is a function of space and time. As far as we know, OTPs proposed in the literature
do not discuss spatiotemporal connectivity issues, though several ( e.g., [7,9,17]) assume channels that
allow high-level parties, including a TTP (e.g., [7]), to communicate with a tag T in real time during
the execution of the OTP: for example, to restart the protocol if it fails. This implies that T must be
physically close to the corresponding high-level parties during the execution of the protocol, which in
many practical scenarios may not be the case. Suppose for example that a client purchases RFID-tagged
items for tracking and counterfeit prevention via the Internet. The seller dispatches the items, and when
these reach the destination, the client requests the transfer of ownership rights. In this case, ownership
transfer takes place in a different location from the seller’s location, and a different connectivity model
is needed, where the seller cannot communicate with the tags at this stage (likewise, buyers cannot
communicate with tags at the beginning of the transaction). We also need a spatiotemporal TTP
network infrastructure in which TTPs may have to communicate in real time (as in [7]). Figure 2
illustrates the differences between the traditional and the extended communication model.
t
Let R1, R2, TTP be the readers of Ownc , Ownn , TTP, T a tag, a, b be OTP parties and ∃ ( a ↔ b),
t

∃ ( a ⇔ b) stand for “there exists a channel at time t between a, b”, “there exists a secure channel at time
t between a, b”, respectively. When t is not indicated, continuous connectivity is assumed. We formally
define the connectivity requirements of the OTP model by the relations:
1
2

∃ (R1 ⇔R2) ∧ ∃ (R1 ⇔TTP)
) ∧ ∃ (R2 ⇔TTP),
t
∃ (R1 ↔ T ) for t0 ≤ t < t1
with t1 ≤ t2 .
t
∃ (R2 ↔ T ) for t2 ≤ t < t3
Thus, a TTP, if deployed, can only communicate with tags T via readers R1, R2.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 2. OTP communication models. (a) Basic model (static); (b) Dynamic model.

4. A Wiretap Channel with Positive Secrecy Capacity
To guarantee the privacy of a new owner Ownn of a tag T and prevent the previous owner
Ownc from accessing T , Ownn and T must agree on a fresh key in the presence of Ownc :
that is, with Ownc a potential eavesdropper. Note that Ownc has full knowledge of the private keys
of T . We shall show that by using Wyner’s wiretap channel [37] with noisy tags, we can achieve
positive secrecy.
The fundamental property of the superposition of the wireless medium can be pitted against
eavesdropping by using interference at the physical layer to degrade communication. Degrading is
implemented via reader-controlled interferers called noisy tags. Noisy tags were first used by
Juels et al. [38] to protect consumers from unwanted RFID scanning. Later, Castellucia and Avoine [39]
used noisy tags for sharing secret keys, which however only addresses passive adversaries since
authentication is not ensured. We shall assume that noisy tags do not present any special features,
so any tag can become a noisy tag. If more sophisticated noisy tags are available, then implementations
with better performance can obviously be achieved.
We use the following notation: X, Y, N are random variables taking values x, y, n in the
alphabets X , Y , N , respectively. Figure 3 depicts our model of a wiretap channel with input alphabets
X , N1 , . . . , NnT , output alphabet Y and transition probabilities p(y| x, n1 , . . . , nnT ).

Figure 3. A model for the wiretap channel with noisy tags.

Tag T transmits the message S (coded as X) to the new owner Ownn (the intended receiver)
with the help of n T noisy tags, in the presence of the current owner Ownc , who acts as a passive
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eavesdropper. The wiretap channel can be seen as a stochastic encoder of X with output alphabet Y .
The variable Y is input to the maximum a posteriori probability (MAP) estimators of Ownn and Ownc ,
but while Ownc only knows the value of Y, Ownn also knows the values of the inputs N1 , . . . , NnT .
Thus, if we assume the wireless medium is noiseless, then the estimate S = s of Ownn is correct,
while the estimate S = s of Ownc is degraded by the stochastic encoder. This degradation can be
quantified by the conditional entropy H ( X |Y ).
H ( X |Y ) =

|X |−1 |Y |−1

∑ ∑

j =0

k =0

− p( x j , yk ) · log2 p( x j |yk )

(1)

The capacity of the eavesdropper channel (Ownc ’s) is defined as Ceav = H ( X ) − H ( X |Y ).
The secrecy capacity for the wiretap model is Cs = Cmain − Ceav , where Cmain is the capacity of the main
channel (Ownn ’s). In the noiseless case, we have Cmain = H ( X ), and therefore, the secrecy capacity
coincides with the conditional entropy of the eavesdropper Cs = H ( X |Y ), while the analysis of secrecy
reduces to the eavesdropper’s channel. In general, the more degraded the wiretap channel, the higher
the secrecy capacity. We assume for this analysis that the adversary cannot identify the source of
each message via signal characteristics (fingerprints, level power, phase shifts, etc.). This implies that
tags should be close and implement the same modulation alphabet; i.e., N j = X , 1 ≤ j ≤ n T .
Possible implementation imperfections, such as delays, signal levels, frequency deviations, etc.,
should not reveal their origin; i.e., be insignificant or have sufficient randomness. Note that this
assumption is implicit in the RFID literature in protocols that address privacy issues: traceability
cannot be prevented if tags are physically identified. In this particular case, to prevent an adversary
from identifying the target tag, we should guarantee that the tag is close enough to the noisy tags and
that it does not present distinguishable imperfections; i.e., insignificant or significant, but changing
in every execution. In practice, fortunately, although it is true that no two tags have identical signals,
the differences are typically insignificant, making it hard to disambiguate them. As a consequence of
the superposition property of the wireless channel, from a theoretical point of view, any modulation
can be used (with initial calibration if required), but in practice, some modulations have better features
than others. Figure 4 shows a simplified example that uses PPM (pulse position modulation). A bit is
encoded by transmitting a pulse in one of two possible time slots. Synchronization between tags is helped
by the fact that they share the same reference (reader’s) signal. Perfect synchronization is not necessary:
tags may have different delays provided there is no pattern that can be exploited to identify a tag.
y0: T and Noisy Tags send ’0’

y1: One tag (T or noisy) sends ’1’, the rest ’0’
2
Volts

Volts

2
0
−2

0
−2

−500

0
500
−500
0
500
µs
µs
y2: One tag (T or noisy) sends ’0’, the rest ’1’
y3: T and Noisy Tags send ’1’
2
Volts

Volts

2
0
−2
−500

0
−2

0
µs

500

−500

0
µs

500

Figure 4. Alphabet Y = {y0 , y1 , y2 , y3 } for tag T and two noisy tags using pulse position modulation (PPM).
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If noise and imperfection implementations are not considered, the security of the system relies
exclusively on the stochastic encoder. For r-ary input alphabets X = { x0 , x1 , ..., xr−1 }, with p( xi ) = 1/r,
|Y |−1

0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, the output alphabet is Y = {yi }i=0 , and the cardinality of Y (combinations with
repetition of r elements taken n T + 1 at a time) and the transition probabilities can be computed
as follows:
!
!
nT + r
nT + r
|Y | =
=
,
(2)
r−1
nT + 1
!
1
nT
p(ym0 m1 ...mr−1 | xi ) = n
(3)
r T
m0 m1 ... mr−1
where ym0 m1 ...mr−1 is the output symbol resulting from the combination of m0 symbols x0 , m1 symbols
x1 , and so on, until mr−1 symbols xr−1 , with m0 + m1 + ... + mr−1 = n T .
Particularizing for binary input alphabets (r = 2), X = { x0 , x1 }, with p( x0 ) = p( x1 ) = 0.5
n +1
(H ( X ) = 1), the output alphabet is Y = {yi }i=T 0 , where yi is the combination of i symbols x0 and
(n T + 1 − i ) symbols x1 . The transition probabilities p(yi | x j ) are given by:
p ( y i | x 0 ) = p ( y N +1− i | x 1 ) = 2

−n T




nT
, i = 0, . . . , n T + 1 .
i

(4)

Ownc ’s detector receives yi and applies the decoding specified by:

n +1

 g( x0 ) if i < T
2
n T even, s =

 g( x1 ) otherwise

nT + 1


 g( x0 ) if i <

2

nT + 1
n T odd, s =
g( x1 ) if i >


2



otherwise, choose at random g( x0 ) or g( x1 )

.

(5)

with g the mapping function g : X → S.
The error probability, defined as pe = Pr [s 6= s], is computed as:
pe = 2

−n T

b n2T −1c 

∑

i =0

nT
i



1
+
2



nT

n T +1
2

!

,

(6)

where the last summand is zero when n T is even. Figure 5 plots the secrecy capacity
Cs of the wiretap channel, the error probability and Fano’s bound, against the number
of noisy tags. Secrecy increases sharply until n T ≈ 5; as n T → ∞, the equivocation
of the eavesdropper approaches the unconditional source entropy, and we get perfect
secrecy: limnT →∞ H ( X |Y (nT ) ) = H ( X ) = 1. For n T = 3, the secrecy capacity Cs = H ( X |Y ) = 0.78
offers a good compromise between features and ease of implementation. The capacity of Ownc ’s
channel is just Ceav = 0.22 bits.
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0.8

Entropy
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Fano’s bound

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
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5

10

15

20

25

nT

Figure 5. The conditional entropy, error and Fano’s bounds of the wiretap channel.

5. An Ownership Transfer Protocol
We next present an example of an OTP that: (i) works according to the communication model
defined in Section 3.2 and (ii) uses a channel with positive secrecy capacity, implemented with noisy
tags, to guarantee the privacy of the new owner.
The protocol addresses practical design features, such as (secure) singulation of tags and the
interrogator-talks-first requirement (communication must be initiated by the reader), and guarantees that
the information stored on the tag coincides with that provided to the new owner (tag assurance [17]).
Note also that it complies with the restrictions in Section 3.1 regarding entities’ capabilities. That is,
while RFID readers can implement fully-fledged cryptographic tools, RFID tags are restricted to
a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) and a cryptographic (one-way, collision-resistant) hash
function F : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n . The number of inputs is, however, designed to be intentionally
low so that it can be more easily adapted to other possible primitives. We assume that identifiers,
random numbers and keys all have the same (bit) length n, which is the security parameter of the
protocol. We introduce our notation.
ID
InfoID
R1, R2
IDR1, IDR2
s1
s2
s2
NT , NT0
NR1
0
NR2 , NR
2
T t∗
s∗t

identifying information of T .
hash of the manufacturer information.
readers of Ownc and Ownn respectively.
identifiers for R1 and R2 respectively.
key that T shares with R1.
key that T shares with R2.
key that T eventually shares with R2.
random numbers generated by T .
random number generated by R1.
random numbers generated by R2.
the t noisy tag, with 1 ≤ t ≤ n T .
the key that the Tt∗ shares with R2.
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5.1. The Ownership Transfer Protocol, Figure 6
Initialization
1.

Initially, each owner knows for each tag ID its information and private key s1 . Likewise, each tag
stores, along with its identifier ID and InfoID , the identifier of its owner IDR1 and the private key.
R1, R2 agree to transfer ownership of tag T with identifier ID. R1 sends (secure channel) R2
manufacturer information about the tag (InfoID when hashed).

R1 ⇒ R2 : ID, manufacturer information
Setup for Ownership Transfer
2.

R1 regularly broadcasts Query messages to detect the presence of tags.
R1 → tags : Query

3.

4.

When T receives a Query (presumably because it is within the range of R1), it selects a random
nonce NT and sends:
T → R1 : F ( NT , s1 ), NT

R1 searches for a pair ( ID, s) in its database to get a match. If there is no match, then the process
is repeated from Step 2. Otherwise, T is singulated: R1 selects a random nonce NR1 and a
request OTR and sends:
R1 → T : OTR, IDR1, IDR2, F (s1 , NT ), NR1

5.

T checks F (s1 , NT ) to authenticate R1. T does not reply if there is no match. Otherwise,
it computes s0 = F ( NT , NR1 , s1 ), saves [IDR2, s0 ], until the protocol completes or a new command
from R1 is received and replies with:
T → R1 : F ( NR1 , s1 )

6.

If this message is not received correctly by R1 after a period of time, the protocol is repeated from
Step 2 (T will replace the stored values IDR2, s0 ). Otherwise, R1 computes s0 = F ( NT , NR1 , s1 )
and confirms (secure channel) to R2 that T is ready to be transferred:

R1 ⇒ R2 : ID is ready, s0
Ownership Transfer
7.

If R2 receives R1’s confirmation, then it is ready to take ownership of T . R2 computes
s2 = F (s0 , InfoID ) and broadcasts regularly Query messages.

R2 → tags : Query
8.

When T receives a Query, it selects a random nonce NT0 and sends:

T → R2 : F ( NT0 , s2 ), NT0
9.

If T is singulated, then R2 selects a fresh random number NR2 and sends:

R2 → T : F (s2 , NT0 ), NR2

Sensors 2017, 17, 53
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10. T checks this message for s2 , and if not correct, for s1 (and waits for new commands). It does
10. T checks this message for s2 , and if not correct, for s1 (and waits for new commands). It does
not reply if this is not correct. If R2 is authenticated, T updates the stored values (IDR1, s1 ) to
not reply if this is not correct. If R2 is authenticated, T updates the stored values (IDR1, s1 ) to
(IDR2, s2 ). These values determine tag ownership. T acknowledges this by sending:
(IDR2, s2 ). These values determine tag ownership. T acknowledges this by sending:

T → R2 : F ( NR2 , s2 )
T → R2 : F ( NR2 , s2 )
11. If the received message is not correct, the protocol is repeated from Step 7. Otherwise, R2 executes
11. If the received message is not correct, the protocol is repeated from Step 7. Otherwise, R2 executes
the key update protocol in Section 5.2 to prevent R1 from accessing T .
the key update protocol in Section 5.2 to prevent R1 from accessing T .
R1
ID, s1

R2
ID, manufacturer information

I

T , ID, InfoID
IDR1, s1
Query



-

F ( NT , s1 ), NT

Generate NR1 , and compute
s0 =F ( NT , NR1 , s1 )

OTR, IDR1, IDR2,
F (s1 , NT ), NR1

-

 F( NR1 , s1 )

ID is ready, s0

I
Compute s2 = F (s0 , InfoID )

T , ID, InfoID
IDR1, s1 , [IDR2, s0 ]
Query



Compute s2 = F (s0 , InfoID )
and generate NT0
F ( NT0 , s2 ), NT0



F (s2 , NT0

-

), NR2

F ( NR2 , s2 )

-

Update to IDR2, s2
Perform the key update protocol (KUP)

Figure
6. The
ownership
transfer
protocol.
Figure
6. The
ownership
transfer
protocol.

5.1.1.
Analysis
5.1.1.
Analysis
In In
thethe
Appendix
A, A,
wewe
shall
useuse
GNY
logic
[12],
which
extends
thethe
Burrows–Abadi–Needham
Appendix
shall
GNY
logic
[12],
which
extends
Burrows–Abadi–Needham
(BAN)
logic
(overcoming
some
of of
its its
problems
[13,14]),
to to
show
thethe
consistency
of of
thethe
assumptions
(BAN)
logic
(overcoming
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based on the structure of the protocol. Strand spaces use free encryption algebra to detect faults that
exploit relations in this algebra. Below, we discuss the most important security properties informally.
1

2

3

4
5

Untraceable singulation: Replies to Query’s (Step 2, Step 7) have the same format and include
a nonce selected by the tag. This prevents tag tracing, since messages look random to anyone who
does not know the secret key.
The privacy of Ownc is guaranteed because the key s1 remains unknown to the new owner Ownn .
Indeed, if Ownn can compute s1 given the values: s0 , NT and NR1 , then Ownn can also find the
F-preimage of s0 , which contradicts the assumption that F is one-way.
Forward secrecy: Suppose the adversary succeeds in getting the new key s2 of a tag. The privacy
of the prior communications is guaranteed, as in the previous case, because to get s1 from s2 ,
one has to invert F.
The privacy of Ownn is achieved by using the key update protocol in Section 5.2.
Tag assurance: InfoID is the hash of manufacturer information about the tag. The collision
resistance of hash functions prevents the adversary from finding another message (pre-image)
0
InfoID
with the same hash to forge the information given by the manufacturer. The use of InfoID
to compute s2 guarantees that the information provided by Ownc to Ownn matches with the
information stored by T . Note, however, that cloned tags and corruptible memories are beyond
this security feature (cf. [17]).

5.2. A Key Update Protocol, Figure 7
The parties are: the reader R2, tag T and n T noisy tags Tt∗ , 1 ≤ t ≤ n T . R2 shares with T a private
key s2 and with each Tt∗ a private key s∗t . In this protocol, T updates privately the key s2 with a fresh
key s̄2 .



T t∗
s∗t

R2
s2 , s∗t

T
ID, s2
0
KCR, NR
2

0
KCR, NR
2

0 , s∗ )
St∗ = F ∗ ( NR
2 t

Generate S
S

- 

St∗

Extract S, and
0 , S, s )
compute s̄2 = F ( NR
2
2



F (S, s̄2 )

F (S, s̄2 )

-

Update s2 to s̄2
0 , s̄ )
F ( NR
2 2

Update s2 to s̄2

Figure 7. Key update protocol (KUP) with noisy tags Tt∗ , 1 ≤ t ≤ n T .
0 .
1 R2 broadcasts a key change request (KCR) with a random nonce NR
2
0
R2 → T , {Tt∗ }nt=T 1 : KCR, NR
2

2 Upon receiving this, T and Tt∗ generate bitstrings S and St∗ of length n/Cs and broadcast these
0 , s∗ ), where F ∗
simultaneously (as specified in Section 4): S is a random number, and St∗ = F ∗ ( NR
2 t
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is a cryptographic hash function of length n/Cs . Note that F ∗ could be built from F; for example,
for Cs = 0.5, F ∗ ( A, B) = F ( A, B)|| F ( A + 1, B), where || denotes concatenation.

T , {Tt∗ }nt=T 1 → R2 : S and {St∗ }nt=T 1
n

0 , S, s ) and
3 R2 receives the added signals of S and {St∗ }t=T 1 , extracts S, computes s̄2 = F ( NR
2
2
broadcasts F (S, s̄2 ).
R2 → T , {Tt∗ }nt=T 1 : F (S, s̄2 )

0 , S, s ) and checks that the message from R2 is correct. If so, T updates its
4 T computes s̄2 = F ( NR
2
2
private key s2 to s̄2 .
0
T → R2 : F ( NR
2 , s̄2 )

5 R2 checks the received message. If correct, the key update protocol (KUP) is completed, and R2
informs R1. Otherwise, R2 sends a new Query and checks if T has updated its key. If not, the KUP
is repeated.
R2 ⇒ R1 : Ownership is transferred.
5.3. Analysis
Attacks by external adversaries on the KUP can target privacy (traceability) or availability
(de-synchronization). These are prevented by the wiretap channel with positive secrecy and
a cryptographic hash function that authenticates messages. More specifically:
Traceability: T remains untraceable because the exchanged messages look random to anyone who
does not know s2 .
0 , s̄ ) or F ( S, s̄ ), that are required by parties
De-synchronization: The adversary cannot compute F ( NR
2
2 s
to update their keys, without knowing s2 .

The protection extends to threats from past and future owners of T . For example, even if R1
knows s1 and can get s2 , R1 does not know the keys s∗t of the noisy tags and, therefore, cannot filter
out St∗ to get S and compute s̄2 . In particular, R1 knows Ceav · n/Cs = (1 − Cs ) · n/Cs bits of S, but the
remaining n bits remain unknown. Thus, once the KUP is completed, R1 has no control over the tag
T and cannot trace it.
6. Conclusions
Cryptographic protection is usually handled at the application layer and cannot exploit signal
features at the physical layer, which restricts its scope. We have shown in this paper that backward
privacy of an OTP can be guaranteed with the use of channels with positive secrecy capacity.
The implementation of such channels with noisy tags has been analyzed and the value n T = 3,
for which the capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel is only Ceav = 0.22 bits, provides a good
compromise between performances and the ease of implementation. We also defined a communication
model for RFID ownership transfer that captures spatiotemporal requirements. Protocols defined
in this model can be applied to a wider range of practical scenarios. Finally, we have presented the
first example of a symmetric-key OTP that does not require a TTP or ISE and formally proved that it is
correct and secure in this model.
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and FEDER under project TEC2014-54110-R. Funds for covering the costs to publish in open access come from
these grants.
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Appendix A. Protocol Analysis
Because of space limitations, we only show here the consistency and correctness of the ownership
transfer (OT) subprotocol in Section 5.1 (Flow 7–Flow 10). The analysis for the first part is similar.
Appendix A.1. GNY Logic
In Figure A1, we present the notation we shall use: P, Q, . . . are protocol parties (principals);
X, Y, . . . are formulae; and s is a key. The conjunction ( X, Y ) is also a formula.
Initial assumptions: At the beginning of each run of the OT subprotocol, we assume that parties T
and R2: (i) believe (trust) each other: T |≡ R2 |≡ T ; (ii) believe that the secret s2 to be shared between
s2
s2
them is suitable: T |≡ (T ←
→
R2) and R2 |≡ (T ←
→
R2); and (iii) believe in the jurisdiction of R1
s2
s2
over the secret s2 : T |≡ R1 |⇒ (T ←
→
R2) and R2 |≡ R1|⇒(T ←
→
R2). In addition, each party
0
possesses the secret key s2 and a fresh nonce: T 3 s2 , T 3 NT , T |≡ ] NT0 , R2 3 s2 and R2 3 NR2 ,
R2 |≡ ] NR2 . Finally, T believes that (s2 , NT0 ) is recognizable, and R2 believes that ( NT0 , s2 ) and
( NR2 , s2 ) are recognizable: T |≡ φ(s2 , NT0 ), R2 |≡ φ( NT0 , s2 ) and R2 |≡ φ( NR2 , s2 ).
P 3 X:

P possesses X

P |≡ X : P believes X

P / X:

P is told (or receives) X

Q |⇒ C : Q has jurisdiction over C

] X : X is fresh
]( X, Y ) : either X or Y is fresh
φ( X ) : X is recognizable P |∼ X : P once conveyed X
∗ X : X is “not originated here” formula
s

P ↔ Q : s is a suitable secret for P, Q

Figure A1. GNY reasoning notation.

The goal of the OT subprotocol is for R2 and T to exchange the key s2 . The GNY logic parses
the description of protocols for formal reasoning. A formalized description of the OT subprotocol is
presented in Figure A2.
7.
8.
9.

T / ∗Query

R2 / ∗ F (∗ NT0 , ∗s2 ), R2 / ∗ NT0

T / ∗ F (s2 , NT0 ), T / ∗ NR2

10. R2 / ∗ F ( NR , s2 )

s

2
T |≡ (T ←
→
R2), T 3 NT0

s2

R2 |≡ (T ←
→ R2), R2 3 NR2
s

2
T |≡ (T ←
→
R2)

Figure A2. The parsed ownership transfer (OT) subprotocol.

In this, Flows 8, 9 and 10 include message extensions (· · ·
X) that are assumed assumptions.
To prove consistency, we must show that on completion of the subprotocol, the following formulae can
s2
s2
be deduced: T 3 s2 , T |≡ (T ←
→
R2), T |≡ R2 3 s2 , R2 3 s2 , R2 |≡ (T ←
→
R2), R2 |≡ T 3 s2 .
Four of these are initial assumptions. Therefore, we only need to show the formulae:

T |≡ R2 3 s2 , and

(A1)

R2 |≡ T 3 s2 .

(A2)

For this purpose, we use the deduction rules of GNY logic. A deduction rule consists of a set
,Pn
of premises P1 , . . . , Pn and a conclusion C, written: P1 , ...
. In Figure A3, we list the rules that we
C
shall use to deduce formulae: f ( X ) and h( X ) are computationally feasible functions of X, with h( X )
a one-way function.
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T1
J1
F1
I3

P / ∗X
P/X

;

P1

P |≡ |⇒C, P |≡ Q |≡ C
;
P |≡ ]( X,Y ), P |≡ f ( X )
P |≡ ] X
;
P |≡ ]( X,Y ), P |≡ f ( X )

P/X
P3X

;
R5
I6

s

P 3 ( X,Y )
P 3 h( X )
P |≡ φ( X ), P 3 X
P |≡ φ(h( X ))
P |≡ Q |∼ X, P |≡ ] X
P |≡ Q3 X

P3

P / ∗ h( X,s), P 3 ( X,s), P |≡ P↔ Q, P |≡ ]( X,s)
P |≡ Q |∼ ( X,s), P |≡ Q |∼ h( X,s)

Figure A3. GNY logic postulates.

To show that Formulas (A1) and (A2) can be deduced from protocol assumptions and transmitted
messages, we analyze below the parsed OT subprotocol in Figure A2.
7.
8.

9.

No belief or possession can be derived from this message.
Apply the being-told rule T1 and the possession rule P1 to R2 / ∗ NT0 to get R2 3 NT0 . Apply the
recognizability rule R5 to the initial assumptions R2 |≡ φ(NT0 , s2 ) to get that R2 recognizes T .
No postulate enables us to further derive new beliefs or possessions from this message.
In particular, we cannot derive the freshness of the message.
Apply rules T1 and P1 to T / ∗ NR2 to get T 3 NR2 . Apply the freshness rule F1 to the initial
assumptions T |≡ ] NT0 , φ(s2 , NT0 ) to get T |≡ ](s2 , NT0 ). Apply the interpretation rule I3 to:
s

10.

2
the previous result, T / ∗ F(s2 , NT0 ) and the initial assumptions T 3 (s2 , NT0 ) and T |≡ (T ←
→
R2) ,
to get T |≡ R2 |∼ s2 . Now, apply rule I6 to get Formula (A1): T |≡ R2 3 s2 .
0 , φ( N 0 , s ) to get
Apply the freshness rule F1 to the initial assumptions R2 |≡ ] NR
2
R2 2
0
0 , s ) and the initial
R2 |≡ ]( NR2 , s2 ). Apply rule I3 to: the previous result, R2 / ∗ F( NR
2 2

s

2
assumptions R2 3 ( NR , s2 ) and R2 |≡ (T ←
→
R2), to get R2 |≡ T |∼ s2 . Now, apply rule I6 to
get Formula (A2): R2 |≡ T 3 s2 .

It follows that the OT subprotocol is consistent. In particular,
(a)
(b)

Possession consistency: transmitted messages only include formulae that the sender possesses;
Belief consistency: message extensions include only beliefs held by the sender at the time he/she
sends the message.

Strand spaces: We next show the correctness of the OT subprotocol using strand spaces [12,15].
To simplify the analysis, we remove Flow 7, which does not provide any cryptographic information.
A strand space Σ is a collection of strands and a graph generated by a causality relation. A strand
s is a sequence of events that represent either a protocol execution by a legitimate party (principal) or
a sequence of actions by a penetrator. We refer to the messages that can be exchanged between the
principals as terms of the strand. In a protocol, principals can either send or receive terms, and this
is represented with a positive or a negative sign, respectively. We write a @ b if a is a subterm of b.
The trace tr(s) of a strand is the sequence of its signed terms. A node of Σ is a pair n = hs, ii, with s ∈ Σ,
1 ≤ i ≤ length(tr(s)). The set of nodes is denoted by N . We say that node n = hs, ii belongs to strand s.
term(n) is the i-th signed term tr(s)i of s.
We write n1 ≺ n2 to indicate that n1 precedes n2 in a strand (not necessarily immediately).
An unsigned term t occurs in n iff t @ term(n);n is an entry point for a set of terms I ⊂ T iff (if and
only if) term (n) = +t for some t ∈ I, and whenever n0 ≺ n, then term (n0 ) ∈
/ I. An unsigned term
0
0
t originates on n iff n is an entry point for I = {t : t @ t }. t is uniquely originating iff t originates
at a unique n ∈ N . A bundle is a portion of a strand space that consists of strands of a protocol
session that are hooked together, where one strand sends a message and the other receives the same
message. For a protocol to be correct, each such bundle must contain one strand for each one of
the legitimate principals participating in a session, with all parties agreeing on nonces and session
keys. The penetrator (adversary) has a set of keys KP (shared with accomplices or “lost”) and a set of
penetrator traces P that model her/his capabilities. Penetration traces typically require hooking several
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atomic traces. In Figure A4, we list the atomic penetrator traces we shall consider [12]. A protocol
attack is captured by combining penetrator traces with protocol strands.
M.
F.
T.
K.

Text message: h+ti
Fushing: h− gi
Tee: h− g, + g, + gi
Key: h+K i

C. Concatenation: h− g, −h, + ghi
S. Separation of components: h− gh, + g, +hi
E. Encryption: h−K, −h, +{ h}K i
D. Decryption: h−K −1 , −{h}K , +hi

Figure A4. Atomic penetrator traces.

Definition A1. (Σ, P ) is an infiltrated strand space if Σ is a strand space and P ⊂ Σ is such that tr( p) is
a penetrator trace for all p ∈ P .
Definition A2. An infiltrated strand space (Σ, P ) is an OTP space if Σ has three kinds of strands:
Step 1.
Step 2.

Penetrator strands s ∈ P
0 ] defined by:
Initiator strands s ∈ Init[T , R2, NT0 , NR
2
0
0
h+( F ( NT0 , s2 ), NT0 ), −( F (s2 , NT0 ), NR
2 ), + F ( NR2 , s2 )i,

Step 3.

0 ∈
with s2 ∈ K, NT0 , NR
2 / K. T is the principal associated with this strand.
0 ], defined by:
Responder strands s ∈ Resp[T , R2, NT0 , NR
2
0
0
h−( F ( NT0 , s2 ), NT0 ), +( F (s2 , NT0 ), NR
2 ), − F ( NR2 , s2 )i,
0 ∈
with s2 ∈ K, NT0 , NR
2 / K. R2 is the principal associated with this strand.

(A) A GREEMENT: the responder’s guarantee:
0 ],
Proposition A1. Suppose that: (Σ, P ) is an OTP space, C a bundle of Σ, s ∈ Resp[T , R2, NT0 , NR
2
s2 ∈
/ KP and NT0 6= NR2 with NR2 uniquely originating in Σ. Then, C contains an initiator strand
t ∈ Init[T , R2, NT0 , NR2 ].

Proof. We prove this using four lemmas. Let n0 be the node hs, 2i (the second node of the reader) that
outputs the term v0 = ( F (s2 , NT0 ), NR2 ) and n3 the node hs, 3i that receives the term v3 = F ( NR2 , s2 ).
Two additional nodes n1 , n2 such that n0 ≺ n1 ≺ n2 ≺ n3 will be identified.
Lemma A1. NR2 originates at node n0 .
Proof. We know that NR2 @ v0 , and the sign of n0 is positive. We just need to show that NR2 6 @ hs, 1i.
Since term (hs, 1i) = ( F ( NT0 , s2 ), NT0 ), we only need to check that NT0 6= NR2 , which is a hypothesis,
and that s2 6= NR2 , which follows from the stipulation NR2 ∈
/ K.
The next lemma establishes that the crucial step is taken by a regular strand and not
a penetrator strand.
Lemma A2. The set S = {n ∈ C : v3 @ term(n) ∧ v0 /@ term(n)} has a −minimal node n2 , which is
regular and has a positive sign.
Proof. S is non-empty because n3 ∈ C ; and n3 contains v3 , but not v0 . Since S is a partially-ordered set
(because C is), it has at least one −minimal node n2 , and its sign must be positive. Therefore, we just
need to check that n2 does not lie on a penetrator strand p. For this purpose, we shall examine all of
the atomic penetrator traces tr( p) listed in Figure A4.
M.

tr( p) = h+ti: Then, NR2 @ t and NR2 originates on t, which is not possible because NR2
originates on the regular node n0 (Lemma A1).
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tr( p) = h− gi: This has no positive nodes.
tr( p) = h− g, + g, + gi or h− g, −h, + ghi: then, the positive nodes are not minimal occurrences.
tr( p) = h+K0 i with K0 ∈ K P : Since v3 @
/K0 , this case does not apply.
tr( p) = h−K0 , −h, +{h}K0 i: Suppose v3 @ {h}K0 . Then, h = NR2 , K0 = s2 . Thus, there is a
node m (the first of this strand) with term (m) = s2 . However, s2 ∈
/ KP , so that this node is
regular, but no regular node originates s2 . This contradicts the initial assumption.
tr( p) = h−K0−1 , −{h}K0 , +hi: If the positive node is minimal in S, then v0 /
@ h and v0 @ {h}K0 .
However, because v0 6= {h}K0 , if v0 @ {h}K0 , then v0 @ h, which is a contradiction.
tr( p) = h− gh, + g, +hi: Assume term (n2 ) = h (there is a symmetric case with term (n2 ) = g).
By the minimality of n2 , v0 @ gh. Hence, g = F ( NT0 , s2 ) and h = NR2 . However, then v3 @
/ h
and n2 ∈
/ S, contradicting the initial assumption.
Therefore, n2 does not lie on a penetrator strand.

Lemma A3. Node n2 follows n1 on the same regular strand t, and term (n1 ) = ( F (s2 , NT0 ), NR2 ).
Proof. From Lemma A1, we know that NR2 originates at n0 , and by assumption, it is unique in Σ.
Furthermore, n2 6= n0 since v0 @ term (n0 ) and v0 @ / −1.5 mm term (n2 ). Therefore, NR2 does not
originate at n2 , and there is a node n1 preceding n2 on the same strand, such that NR2 @ term (n1 ).
By the minimal property of n2 , v0 @ term (n1 ). However, as no regular node contains a combination
as a proper subterm, term(n1 ) = ( F (s2 , NT0 ), NR2 ).
Lemma A4. The regular strand t containing n1 and n2 is an initiator strand contained in C .
Proof. n1 precedes n2 in the same strand. Node n2 is a positive regular node and comes after a node
with the form ( F (s2 , NT0 ), NR2 ). Hence, t is an initiator strand, since a responder strand would only
contain a negative node after one of that form. Thus, n1 and n2 are the second and the third nodes of t,
respectively.
Lemmas A3 and A4 complete the proof of Proposition A1.
Proposition A2. If (Σ, P ) is an OTP space and NT0 is uniquely originating in Σ, then there is at most
0 ] for any T , R2 and N .
one strand t ∈ Init[T , R2, NT0 , NR
R2
2
Proof. Let t ∈ Init[T , R2, NT0 , NR2 ] for T , R2 and NR2 . Then, ht, 1i is positive, NT0 @ termht, 1i,
and NT0 cannot possibly occur earlier on t. Therefore, NT0 originates at node ht, 1i. Since NT0 originates
uniquely in Σ, there can be at most one such t.
(B) A GREEMENT: the initiator’s guarantee:
Proposition A3. Suppose that: (Σ, P ) is an OTP space, C is a bundle of Σ, s ∈ Init[T , R2, NT0 , NR2 ],
s2 ∈
/ KP and NT0 is uniquely originating in Σ. Then, there exists a responder strand t ∈ Resp[T , R2, NT0 , NR2 ].
Proof. Consider the set {m ∈ C : F (s2 , NT0 ) @ term(m)}. This is not empty, because it contains hs, 2i,
and so, it contains a minimal node m0 . If m0 lies on a regular strand t, then we can show that
t ∈ Resp[T , R2, NT0 , NR2 ]. If instead, m0 lies on a penetrator strand p, then p should be an E-strand
with trace: h−s2 , − NT0 , + F (s2 , NT0 )i, but this contradicts the assumption s2 ∈
/ KP .
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